How to Found a State? Seized and Missed Opportunities: Parallel Histories of two Post-Ottoman State Building Initiatives

Fast-backward to 1900. Imagine we are there, not knowing the future, just a small piece of it. Namely, that a non-Muslim, stateless people in the Ottoman Empire will achieve independence and statehood, sometime in the century ahead, on a territory which was Ottoman then. Make your bet: which will it be? Quite likely most gamblers, somewhat familiar with the realities of the Empire would have bet on Armenians and Armenia.

They would have been wrong and lost. It was the Jewish people and Israel. True, Armenia also gained full statehood some 70 years after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, but it was not on former Ottoman territories. Why were even well-informed onlookers so wrong? In the following pages we try to recall, in the framework of a comparative analysis the two parallel efforts by these two people.

Both lost their statehood, for close to one or two millennia and in the distant past. Consequently, both had to bear more than just occasionally the brunt of discrimination and oppression by hostile host nations. Following a glorious history of various empires and kingdoms stretching back to thousands of years, the last independent Armenian state entity, the Kingdom of Cilicia finally fell under Muslim control in 1375. Ancient Israel’s independent existence came to an end — by most accounts — in 63 BC. It was then that a long period of Roman, Byzantine and Muslim rule of those lands started, combined with the dispersion of the Jewish people to three continents.

There is no space to go into the details of the parallel history of the two nations from losing independence to around 1900, the year our story begins. Suffice to say that among the many differences and similarities one difference sticks out: the Armenian people, following the loss of independence were not dispersed in any comparable manner. As we will see later, this difference was more than a minor detail.

In the 19th century European, Orthodox subject people of the Ottoman Empire gradually regained their independence in a long process of territorial expansion, most notably in the case of Greece. In the case of Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania an ever decreasing level of limitations on sovereignty was the main feature of the process. All of these people, however, with the partial exceptions of Greeks, lived in massive and relatively homogeneous blocks on more peripheral territories of the Empire.

Two other stateless people — Jewish and Armenian — had a different demographic reality. The native Jewish population, in what was then the vilayets of Beirut and Jerusalem (Kudüs), became a marginalized and impoverished minority there, limited to some 60 thousand people only. Prosperous and bigger Jewish communities lived in three major cities of the Empire, Istanbul, Izmir and Salonika, a total of some 150,000. They, however, were not natives, mostly having come from Spain after 1492 following the Reconquista and the extensive expulsion of Moorish and Jewish people from Catholic Spain.

The “Six Vilayets”

As for Armenians, their presence in the former Armenian states’ territories, mostly the so-called “Six Vilayets” (Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Erzurum, Mamuret ul-Aziz, Van) was significant. However, they were still a minority, with the possible exception of Van where Armenians were still a relative majority at the turn of the century. Strong Armenian communities lived in many urban centers of the empire. Statistics, though, are very challenging here. The Ottoman census of 1914 put their numbers at a mere 1.16 million, while the Armenian Patriarchate’s figure was 1.914 million, over 10% of the Empire’s total of 18.5 million. (They came to this figure by correcting the presumed errors and omissions of the earlier Turkish census. This was done by local bishops and other Armenian religious leaders.) While systematic, tax-evasion generated underreporting and even some zealotry by Turkish officials is quite likely, the Patriarchate’s figures completely lacked documented methodology and sources. Consequently, the most prudent approach is to choose a middle-of-the road figure somewhere in the range of 1.5 million. (Also, some 1 million Armenians lived in neighboring Russia and Iran at that time.)

Am original, French-language Summary Chart of the 1914 Ottoman Census

The idea of the lost homeland lived on strong in both nations, both in the diaspora and in the people who stayed in the ancient homeland over which sovereignty had been lost. “When they therefore were come together, they asked of him, saying, Lord, wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdom to Israel?” (Acts 1:6)

“Our churches are in the hands of unbelievers, they took captives, alas, how many destroyed churches, how many new mosques built … how much blood shed…God, why are you taking revenge? … we are not statues of iron?”. This how the 14th century Armenian poet, Frik laments in his poem. The Lamentations over the lost homeland developed into the most widely circulated genre in both ecclesiastical and secular Armenian literature.

After many hundreds of years of silence, national reawakening started to take shape later in the 19th century. For the Jewish people of Central and Eastern Europe, where they lived in biggest numbers, it was the Zionist movement. This may be dated back to 1896, the year the Zionist Manifesto was published. For the Armenians, it was the mostly Socialist oriented Dashnak Party and the primarily Nationalist Hunchak Party, founded in 1887 and 1890 respectively, both outside Ottoman Turkey. Of the three, in the first decades, Zionists were the most compromise-seeking and violence-avoiding.

After this short detour, we are back to 1900, the year our imaginary betting shop is selling its tickets on the future of state-building by the two stateless people in the Ottoman Empire. Let us stress again: in the historic core territories of these two people, both within the Ottoman Empire then, there lived some 60 000 Jewish people and close to a million Armenians. It would have been easy to conclude that this was a race with one obvious underdog…

From then on, important milestones are Theodore Herzl’s countless meetings with important personalities of his era, to seek support for his “Jewish Homeland” initiative. He was even received by Abdulhamid II, the Turkish Sultan in 1901, during one of his five visits to Istanbul. Interestingly enough, while the Sultan was in favor of Jewish immigration into other parts of his Empire — the experiences with the Jewish refugees from Spain some 400 years before were by and large positive — he rejected the idea of the Jewish repopulation of Palestine. He somehow foresaw the potential for ethno-religious conflicts which this could have entailed. Then in 1917 came the Balfour Declaration. In this, for the first time in two thousand years, a World Power committed herself to support the idea of a Jewish state entity. Parallel to this, the world’s most prosperous Jewish community, the one in the USA also committed itself with ever increasing determination to this cause. The small money boxes in so many American Jewish households — as described by Golda Meir in her autobiography, “My Life” — were regularly filled up and their contents donated to help Jewish land acquisition in Palestine.

The same years were less constructive and peaceful for Armenians. There were rebellions by isolated, but not small Armenian armed groups between 1894 and 1904. These were often provoked by government actions and were followed routinely by massive and bloody retributions by the Turkish military, with armed local Muslim gangs often joining in. There were armed actions by Armenian “patriots” or “bandits”, depending on the perspective. These would qualify today as acts of terrorism, most notably the attack on the Ottoman Bank in Istanbul in 1896. There is no point in trying to parcel out blame. However, the fact remains that Armenians gradually ceased to be perceived by the Muslim majority as the “millet-i sadika” (“loyal nation”). This was applied earlier to Armenians, but later, following these developments it gave way to deep suspicion and mistrust. This mistrust was further reinforced by the traumatic experiences of the First Balkan War. In this former Ottoman subject people regained vast Ottoman territories and countless atrocities were committed against Muslim Turks in the “occupied” or “liberated” territories, again depending on the perspectives.

It is time now to catalogue the similarities and the differences at that time between these two people.

First similarities. Both nations went through the experience of national revival and formulated its desire for a national homeland, not subjected to the controls and whims of hostile master states. A strange asymmetry could though be observed here. For Armenians this oppressive master state was first and foremost Ottoman Turkey where some 45% of Armenians lived. The presence of close to a million Armenians in Russia, more than a quarter of all Armenians did not produce the same emotions. (Christianity prevailing in the Czarist Russian Empire was obviously a factor.) Armenian emigration from Turkey gained momentum after 1886. However, the diaspora outside Armenian historic core territories — split between Turkey, Russia and to smaller degree Iran — was not very significant. Less than one quarter of all Armenians lived outside these three countries.

For the Jewish people it was the diaspora outside Ottoman Turkey — all the way from the USA to Russia — where their overwhelming majority, over 95% lived. The number of Jewish people in the historic core territory, that is the two vilayets of Beirut and Jerusalem was negligible, perhaps only one in 300 hundred lived there. To sum this up it is safe to say that while the “center of gravity” for Armenians was endogenous in the Ottoman territories, for the Jewish people it was exogeneous in the diaspora.

Both people suffered discrimination and hostility, although their dynamics were somewhat different. In Turkey for Armenians it was a new phenomenon. It started in the last decades of the 19th century and its intensity was on the increase. In previous centuries it was not markedly different from or worse than what other non-Muslim “millets” (people) had to endure in the Ottoman Empire.

For Jewish people in Europe by the turn of the century emancipation was a seemingly — at least on the longer run and in Western and Central Europe — unstoppable development. Only Russia was lagging behind with her all-too-frequent pogroms, discriminatory legislation and restrictions on residence.

Both nations had an extremely strong religious and cultural heritage and were strongly rooted in their historic traditions. This resulted in a unique continuity of national, linguistic and religious identity. This continuity helped to resist assimilation which terminated the existence of so many scattered diaspora people throughout history. Also, both nations had a strong, mystical attachment to their lost homeland. Here, however, as far as demographic and geopolitical realities were concerned, strong differences prevailed.

Both nations were often culturally more advanced and better schooled than their host people. Consequently — although here other factors also played a role — many of them were engaged in non-farming activities, such as financial intermediation and certain profitable trades and crafts. This resulted in an accumulation of wealth which more often than not triggered envy and jealousy among host populations, poisoning the relationship between these communities, burdened also by their religious separation.

One very strong similarity could also be mentioned. This, however, as significant as it turned out to be for the outcome of the two state-building projects, around 1900 was still wrapped in the uncertainty of the future. Namely that these two nations, between 1915–17 and 1939–45, respectively, suffered the most brutal and lethal genocide/ethnic cleansing that the otherwise so bloody 20th century produced.

Major differences, however, were also noticeable.

As mentioned earlier, the Armenian national movement was endogenous, its basic strategy targeting a significant part of Eastern Anatolia, then — and even today — under the control of the Turkish state. It was clear even then that the strength of this movement is nearly not sufficient, so the ascending power of Imperial Russia was sought as a major sponsor to change the status quo. (It was not unknown even then that Imperial Russia is strongly centralized, not recognizing minority rights and at least in the beginning a genuinely independent Armenian state entity would not be a likely outcome.) The Armenian leadership of the two parties thus step-by-step shifted its loyalty to the Russian state while it was also opening up to the then ascending revolutionary movements there. This burned every bridge leading to a solution within the crumbling Ottoman state. All this was known to Turkish officialdom and was a somewhat “narrow path” strategy: all hopes were pinned on an eventual Russo-Turkish war. In this war the victorious Russian army would drive out Ottoman occupiers and then somehow Armenians would be in a better position to gain autonomy or perhaps even independence.

The Zionist movement chose a less narrow path strategy and showed more flexibility. Options involving support from more governments, such as the Turkish, German, British were permanently considered. Even such abortive ideas as the “Uganda Option”, relying on Great Britain’s goodwill were briefly on the agenda. Also, the declared goals of the movement were formulated very carefully, emphasis being put primarily on not much beyond promoting Jewish settlement activities in Palestine. With the wisdom of hindsight it made perfect sense: a weak movement with little means and support should not open too wide a front right in the beginning.

The Armenian movement was extremely ambitious, focusing on the mirage (or chimera?) of the various ancient Armenian empires of the past two millennia. Demographic realities on the ground had changed in the meantime. Even Armenian Patriarchate records — putting the number of their flock much higher than Turkish census data — claimed Armenian absolute majority in only one of the Six Vilayets.

1914 Armenian Patriarchate population figures for the “Six Vilayets”

As the map shows below, a clear ethnic majority — more or less corresponding to the present Armenian Republic — covered only a very small corner of former Armenian homelands, and that was mostly in Russia. Consequently, in the case of Armenia mostly unfounded demographic claims mixed with historic ones, creating a confusion and a lack of clarity of objectives.

The Zionist movement — apart from the occasionally recalled slogan of “a land without a people for a people without a land” — demographic claims could not be and were not laid, as in the core historic Palestinian area Jewish people were a tiny minority. Claims were clearly historic, based on the never abandoned idea of “right of return”. This, while being ambitious, helped to keep a clarity of vision and purposes.

The map below illustrates — again with the wisdom of hindsight — the imbalance between ambitions and realities in the Armenian case, final reality represented by the actual shape of the Armenian nation state.

Zionist claims were also ambitious, more so in light of demographic realities. However, the mismatch between chimeras of historic nostalgia and objectives and subsequent actual achievements was markedly smaller. (It has to be mentioned though that from a historic perspective it is still too early to call. Considering the dynamics of Jewish settlement activities in the West Bank, it is quite possible in the future this mismatch will further shrink. For Armenia prospects are bleaker, as the loss of the de facto, even if not de jure, control of Armenian-inhabited areas of Azerbaijan is a possibility not to be neglected.) Not that on the Israeli extreme political right there are no more ambitious ideas, dreaming about expansion and claiming historic rights over areas which have now been parts of neighboring Arab states for many decades. These, however, are anything but mainstream. Mainstream political forces are focusing their energies on securing long-term control over the West Bank and the international recognition of this expansion and, more importantly, on the internal/external security of the actual Jewish state.

The differences between a fundamentally exogeneous (Jewish) and endogenous (Armenian) state-building paths were made more dramatic by how the two genocidal tragedies of the two people impacted the future of those two projects. The Armenian tragedy simply removed the already-not-very-strong demographic claim from the equation. The Jewish tragedy by Hitler’s death machinery — which had a vastly superior coverage in world media — generated worldwide sympathy and triggered a wave of emigration. This helped to reach the “tipping point” in successfully resisting Arab attempts to prevent the establishment of the Jewish state. This tragedy, however, did not weaken decisively the strength of the worldwide diaspora, rather, it strengthened its resolve. The almost total annihilation and violent removal of the Armenian population, on which a demographic claim had been made, was enhanced by the defeat and subsequent implosion of the Russian Empire. Russia was the main — if not exactly altruistic — sponsor of the Armenian drive for autonomy and possible independence. A war which was supposed to be fought alongside Russia finally had to be fought with no allies. Armenians were on their own, with an obvious disparity of forces. (It is illustrative how from later 1917 on, with the winds of revolutionary change blowing over the trenches of the Russo-Turkish front, then deep inside Turkey, Russian and other nationality soldiers just packed up and went home. They simply left Armenians ones to man this long frontline, a “mission impossible”.) Not that the two avenues or strategies — one basically self-reliant and the other heavily reliant on support from the influential, mostly US-based diaspora — was very much a matter of choice. The Armenian diaspora’s financial weight, cultural influence and sheer numbers, not to mention their access to world media channels as they were known then, were not comparable to what was available to the Zionist movement.

With the wisdom of hindsight we know that there was one more “asset” of which the Zionist movement had much more. Namely, patience. Although it is obvious that some fights may not be avoided, it is also true that it is a great advantage to pick the time for your fights carefully, not too early. The leaders of the Armenian national movements seem to have rushed often prematurely into conflicts. The three major pre-WWI revolts between 1894–1904 (mostly Sasun, Zeitun and Van) could not be successful. They resulted in major loss of life, against some success in drawing the world’s attention to the Armenian cause. Also, the Armenian national movement has placed its bets very strongly on Russia’s victory. The war was indeed going well against Turkey, here the Russian Army made good progress, reaching by 1916 a line as far as beyond Trabzon and Erzincan, all the way down to Bitlis. In the areas occupied — from an Armenian perspective “liberated” — the Armenian national movement quickly organized itself. In particular in spots not strictly controlled by the Russian Army more than just occasionally started to settle the scores with the Muslim population. On the Western Front, however, Russia started to yield to German pressure. This eventually led to the collapse of the Turkish Front. Advancing Turkish troops continued the cycle of violence, driving out or worse any remaining Armenian communities surviving the 1915–16 expulsions and massacres.

The Zionist movement patiently limited military action to self-defense or retaliation and against only Arabs until 1939 or so. Armed actions against British Mandate Authorities started just before the war, to be frozen as the war started. No matter what the movement’s objectives were, it made little sense “to fight the enemy of my enemy”. Insurgency against the British Mandate was resumed only in the final months of WWII. By then it was clear that Britain’s interest in continuing the Mandate was declining fast. Jewish insurgents were fighting on a two front-war, against Arabs and British, both standing in the way of the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. At that time the insurgent groups of the Jewish community, such as Irgun, Haganah, Lehi obtained clear military superiority if not against neighboring Arab states, but against the Palestinian Arab community. The use of overwhelming, close to unrestrained force was avoided until the First Arab-Israeli War. This, in its later stage, was an asymmetrical military conflict where at the price of small casualties the demographic balance of the newly born Jewish State could be quite drastically tilted towards the Jewish community.

Limited independence was a much longer-lasting experience for Armenians. The chimera of Wilsonian Armenia — it would have been a state where Armenians were supposed to be small minority, see map below — burnt to ashes as the Sevres Peace Treaty was relegated to history by 1921. Then came the chaotic period of a formally independent but very porous and tenuous First Republic.

“Wilsonian Armenia”

Finally, in December 1922 Armenia was incorporated into what later came to known as the USSR. This was certainly not a state where genuine economic development could take place and which — with its limited freedoms and lack of private enterprise — could become a magnet for the Armenian diaspora.

Soviet Armenia, 1922–1991

For Israel the precursor to full statehood, the Mandate in Palestine, see map below — what was 70 years for Armenia — was only 26 years, from 1922 to 1948.

Following full independence and years of austerity, Israel developed a very advanced economy and attracted not just investment, financial support but also a high number of immigrants from the diaspora. Unlike investment, they came mostly not necessarily from the advanced Western world, rather from Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia and, in the 90s, from the former Soviet Union. Unlike earlier immigrants they were not so much attracted by the lack of discrimination, rather by the material benefits the successful Israeli state could offer. (With the downside of living in a country which is isolated in her narrower geopolitical environment and, from time to time, security threats looming over every citizen.)

The Charts below is supposed to explain it better than words. It shows how the Jewish State grew in population, which correlates with economic strength, not to mention military prowess. (I spare the reader the relevant economic data on GDP or GNP, exports and start up/high tech businesses.) Now it is hosting more than half of the Jewish people worldwide. Their number in diaspora is reduced by assimilation but also by the weakness of statistical methodology. This seems to be quite helpless in answering “who is a Jewish person” in countries where religious and national identity is fast losing ground to a more secular and cosmopolitan way of life.

The picture for Armenia is less bright. Its population growth was less dynamic than that of the diaspora. Still only some one third of Armenians live in their mother country, although — needless to say — the statistical margins of error are just as high as in the case of Israel and figures for the diaspora are necessarily rather arbitrary. Besides, Armenia is poorer than even the poorest of her neighbors (Georgia) and is also geographically isolated. Not unlike Israel she is locked in a seemingly never-ending military conflict, with Azerbaijan but indirectly also with Turkey. However, very much unlike Israel, she is the underdog with a weak, small army and with only a hesitant ally, that is Russia.

How would it be possible to sum up all the similarities and differences and draw some conclusions? How could the story of the “also-ran” overtaking and winning by a wide mile be explained? Half seriously: is there any lesson in all this for future state builders?

The explanation may be found in the physics of leverage. Armenians, due to multiple reasons, had to build their state on a very much weakened demographic basis, in international isolation and with almost no help from a relatively weak diaspora. This was like lifting a heavy weight with sheer muscle power. The builders of the Jewish State could use leverage. Consequently their effort was grossly augmented by the weight of the diaspora, as if the rules of physics were applied. The fulcrum — the staunch identification with the Land of the predecessors — was strong enough to bear this extra force. The results spoke for themselves. Just see the two statues below, it explains it all.